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Abstract. Th is article aims at proposing a way to identify humour by means of 
Greimassian semiotics and to single humour out as a unique object of semiotic analysis. 
Firstly, the article discusses the fundamental epistemological premises of semiotic text 
analysis through the analysis of texts by Greimas which were meant to further and 
legitimize his project of semiotics. Also, the already existing attempts at providing a 
semiotic defi nition of humour are critically evaluated while relating their problematic 
aspects with the implicitly defi ned fi eld of semiotic interest. Finally, it is demonstrated 
that a productive semiotic description of a comic text is possible when the status 
quo epistemological views are revised and the traditional fi eld of semiotic analyses is 
expanded accordingly.
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Although diff erent disciplines in the humanities, from psychology to linguistics, have 
proposed several theories of humour, hitherto semiotics has been lacking a universally 
accepted methodology fi t for explanation and description of humour. Naturally, the 
question arises: is this object irrelevant to semiotics or does it, so far, have no adequate 
tools of analysis with regard to this problematic? As language and literature are among 
the main objects of semiotics, humour should be part of the sphere of semiotic interest. 
Th e more so, there were some attempts, even if they were not without fault, at describing 
comic texts by semiotic means. Th erefore I believe that before trying to overcome 
such a methodological inadequacy, one should fi rst of all reveal its causes. With this 
aim in mind, I will demonstrate in this article that the application of semiotics to 
the analysis of humour, that has hardly been successful up to now, depends on its 
epistemological premises. Upon their revision it is possible to somewhat broaden 
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semiotics methodologically, which would enable us to approach the problematic of 
humour more effi  ciently.
It should be emphasized that the article is not concerned with semiotics in general, 
but only discusses the semiotics of Algirdas Julius Greimas, also known as Paris School 
semiotics, such as it appears in the works of Greimas and his direct followers. Th erefore 
no attempt at a compehensive overview of existing semiotic theories of humour will 
be made. Rather than that, I shall limit myself to drawing a perspective emerging 
from critical evaluation of certain theoretical viewpoints and make use of only those 
developments which are, to my knowledge, closest to that perspective. Relying on the 
premise that, once formulated in Greimas’ works, principles of semiotic analysis did not 
undergo any radical transformations, the works by Greimas himself will be employed 
when presenting, and I will limit myself only to those premises of semiotics which 
enable to explicate the fundamental aspects of semiotic approach to humour as made 
possible by Greimas’ theory and attempted by his successors.
Th e same applies to the conception of humour. What is central to the article is the 
possibility of providing a semiotic defi nition of humour on the basis of Greimassian 
semiotics. A general defi nition of humour would be too broad and obscure as it would 
either involve the usage of concepts supposedly belonging to “common knowledge”, 
or turn into a list of specifi c conceptions of humour. In order to scrutinize the 
methodological problematics of the Greimassian approach to humour, I will explore 
the weak points of the existing defi nitions of humour as well as the reasons behind 
them and the possible solutions to the issues.
1. The precession of meaning: The narrative mind
Right from the start, the semiotics of Algirdas Julius Greimas was built up as a general 
theory of meaning. However, when talking about meaning directly, especially when 
using natural language for this purpose, one encounters the problem that any defi nition 
of meaning is inevitably tautological. Th at is, not only must the term ‘meaning’ be 
meaningful itself, but also its defi nition has to have meaning, and accordingly, one 
always has to talk about “the meaning of the meaning” and so on ad infi nitum. But, 
paradoxically, the indeterminateness of meaning is not a problem for Greimas so far as 
it is not meaning, but rather the conditions of its manifestation that are talked about: 
“Man lives in a meaningful world. Th e problem of meaning does not arise for him, 
the meaning is here – it penetrates him as obviousness, as a totally natural sense of 
understanding” (Greimas 1970: 189). Even if meaning hardly – or not at all – yields 
to articulation, it is anyway recognized as an essential attribute of human existence, 
while indicating that in our everyday experiences we constantly and inevitably perceive 
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something as meaningful. Such everyday experiences allowed Greimas to state that 
“signifi cation is nothing else than transposition of one level of language into another, 
of one language into another diff erent language, and meaning is nothing else than this 
possibility of transcoding” (Greimas 1970: 81). So on the one hand, meaning and its 
experience is established as unquestionable and primary with regard to any articulation 
and successful communication. On the other hand, it becomes an explicit premise of 
the semiotic project. Th e problem consists not in the experience of meaning, but in 
describing the conditions of that experience.
With this epistemological step Greimas dissociates himself from the solely 
philosophical problematic of meaning. Once he decides on certain unquestionable 
axioms, he does not pursue the question of why they are unquestionable; instead, he 
creates a system implied by a set of such axioms in the hope that it would be vindicated 
by its effi  ciency. What matters is not truth, but scientifi c consistency. However a method 
based on any chosen epistemology should naturally express the conceptual implications 
of that choice in a structured manner. Both logical analysis and hermeneutical practises 
are just ways of perceiving meaning (or examining the possibility of its existence) which 
presume the conditions characteristic of experience of meaning. For instance, in case 
of formal logic it would be the experience of absence of contradiction, and in case of 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics it would be a belief that a truthful and full-fl edged 
perception can only be that of ourselves. Accordingly, when one explicates the essential 
traits of Greimas’ project of semiotics, one should be able to see what conditions are 
necessary for the perception of any object as potentially meaningful.
In this respect, Paris School semiotics is, fi rst of all, meant for articulation of 
coherence. It is not a tool of interpretation, but rather that of translation into meta-
language and it is needed so that a reader could strictly analytically describe the result 
of a process of reading a text as coherent: “I fi nd [this same] synergy between implicit 
understanding and explicit explanation on all the levels of the construction of Greimas’s 
model” (Ricoeur 1990: 115). Th e “implicit understanding” mentioned by Ricoeur is 
an identifi cation of a certain formal model of the birth of meaning, the explication 
of which allows to articulate the signifi cation of text. It is in this context that several 
important methodological aspects shared by semiotics (and structuralism in general) 
and phenomenology are fundamental.
(1) Both structuralism (which is in this case represented by Greimassian semiotics) 
and phenomenology share the same starting point, i.e. an antagonistic relation to 
psychologism as a form and method of scientifi c explanation and a hostility to reduction 
of one science to another. Accordingly, the positive task of science which has got rid of 
psychologism and causal explanation is the explanation of structural relations.
Th erefore, both phenomenology and structuralism start from the fundamental 
principle of Gestalt theory which asserts that every object of consciousness depends 
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on its fi eld and can be understood only through considering its relational location 
and context. When describing the whole which is given together with every separate 
part, Husserl uses the notion of the horizon. In the last paragraphs of the second 
meditation of Cartesian Meditations he delivers an essential insight which is the 
methodological guide of phenomenological analysis: every object of consciousness 
necessarily refers to something beside itself, to other interrelated possible objects of 
consciousness which form a system (Husserl 1982: 54–55). Th us the requirement to 
conduct a phenomenological reduction, i.e. to bracket preconceptions and knowledge 
to acquire a critical distance with regard to the phenomena that are being described. 
In case of structuralism, this manifests itself as an operation of setting strict limits 
to text, which has become one of the main principles of the European tradition of 
semiotics. An internally closed system is not only the inseparable relation of the 
signifi ed and the signifi er, but also the unity of the text structure established by the 
planes of expression and content. An explicit requirement to “frame” a text enables 
the analysis of its inner structure and, accordingly, the articulation of signifi cation. For 
instance, for Russian formalists the bracketing of preconceptions becomes an important 
methodological requirement in struggles against physiological explanations of language 
or psychological interpretations of literature. Finally, the later branch of structuralism 
in guise of Greimassian semiotics is characterized by “the principle of text immanence”, 
i.e. the principle of explaining the text from within and not relying on extra-textual 
elements (such as the biography or psychology of its author, his or her ideological-social 
position). Th us, the isolation of the text becomes the fundamental methodological 
principle, and a semiotician when performing an analysis is behaving as a philosopher 
in pursuit of a phenomenological description.
(2) According to Husserl, an object is always actually perceived in the background 
of certain anticipation concerning the possible further course of perception. Before 
being perceived as an actual manifestation, every object has a status of one of the many 
possible variants compatible with the content of the intentional relation. In other words, 
the object is perceived as the same in several possible situations which are compatible 
with the noematic sense of the act and with the implicit data on the object, data that 
is dispersed throughout the whole system of intentional relations. It is these possible 
situations that constitute the horizon of an object, and the possible intentional relations 
which correlate with them constitute the horizon of the act of perception. It is because 
of this relation that phenomenological investigation never gets lost in incoherent 
descriptions, but is always well-organized. So, in phenomenology intentionality is a 
characteristic of consciousness which enables us to perceive the world as coherent. One 
can perceive things as phenomena consisting of infi nitely many “profi les” only if one 
performs phenomenological reduction, however it is intentionality of consciousness 
that forms the noematic (i.e. the one that presupposes the whole) side of the “thing”.
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In case of Greimassian semiotics the perception of the coherent whole always 
happens before the analysis is performed. His conception of meaning as of the possibility 
of transcoding obviously relies on the coherent whole of the text: “meaning refers not 
only to what words mean to us, it also is a certain direction, or, philosophically speaking, 
intentionality and purposefulness” (Greimas 1970: 193). In Ricoeur’s terms, it is to 
the end of explicating the experience of this purposefulness which manifests itself as 
coherence of text that the narrative grammar (as one of the most important aspects 
of early Greimassian semiotics) is made use of. It is obvious that both the conception 
of transformation (i.e. transition from one state to another; sequence of utterances of 
state and utterances of doing, which establishes the conception of narrative) and the 
actantial scheme, which is based upon the (economic) exchange of values, connect the 
heterogenic discoursive level of text on strong basis of logical purposefulness. Such a 
scheme, which rests on order as the initial starting point and its fi nal restoration as a 
goal in itself, obviously asserts a certain conception of the world. It is thus the somewhat 
transcendental perception of coherence that Ricoeur associates with the narrative mind 
and with the act of understanding. 
(3) Finally, it is important to note the importance to Greimas of bodily experience 
of the natural world, which is structured as language (its perception manifests itself 
through diff erences) and which is also characterized by an essential coherence: “[...] 
a common trait of natural signs is to refer to (renvoyer) to other things as well as to 
themselves“ (Greimas 1970: 228). Th is statement is a direct reference to Merleau-Ponty 
who maintains that thinking always reveals a subject in a particular situation of being 
in the world.
According to Merleau-Ponty (2005: 170), the body is the “place” though which 
the world is given to us and through which we communicate with it. Accordingly, no 
explanation is meaningful if it cannot recreate an experienced equivalent of the relations 
that it formalizes. From a semiotic point of view, this means that in order to understand 
and describe such essential elements of the narrative grammar as, for example, lack and 
its elimination, hierarchical relations of actants, diff erences of objects of value or the 
polemic structure of actants, it is impossible to rely only on the deductive, speculative 
reason. All of this already presupposes a former knowledge-understanding what it 
means to be in the world with humans and among them and what it means to lack, to 
desire, to satisfy a desire and to fi ght for the objects of value.
It seems that such an obviously privileged position of experience of everyday world 
allows us to state that for Greimas it is language that is structured like the experience 
of the world. It seems that Greimas actually hopes that language (as well as texts) will 
function as if it is fi t to describe a world understood in a certain way, i.e. the world of 
common sense where coherence and stability, allowing for recognition and successful 
communication, are in force.
142 Dmitrij Gluscevskij
It is here that one can speculatively mark the limits of description as conceived by 
Greimas. Expectation of coherent unity re-establishes that which structuralism and 
phenomenology fi ghts against in psychologism and metaphysical thinking. What is 
fi xed in “explicit explanation” depends necessarily on the way of conceptualizing the 
“implicit understanding” and its “scheme of analysis”. Phenomenologically speaking, 
the ability to capture and analyse states of consciousness is formed on the basis of the 
ability to perceive and describe the physical and social objects, i.e. by using analogues 
of conceptual schemes used for the analysis of phenomena of consciousness that are 
based on the knowledge of diff erent types of phenomena of reality.
2. Joke organization: A chronological axis
Having defi ned the epistemological implications of semiotic description, one can 
more effi  ciently elucidate the problematic aspects of Greimassian semiotics’ relation to 
humour. In order to do this, I will evaluate the two most infl uential attempts at semiotic 
humour analysis, which were then supplemented by their adherents but which were not 
changed cardinally. In the broadest sense they can be described as the isotopic model 
and the model of narrative functions. As indicated by the names, when applying these, 
one uses the aspects of Greimas’ theory discussed in the previous section.
(1) In the chapter of Structural Semantics where isotopies are being discussed, Greimas 
analyses a pun-based joke:
It is a luxurious and extremely elegant party among the people from high society 
with selected guests. Two guests go out on a terrace to get some fresh air.
– Oh, – says one of them, content, – isn’t this a great evening? Th e food is wonderful... 
and what lovely toilettes [=toilets/dresses], aren’t they?
– Oh? – replies the other. – I’m afraid, that I cannot comment on.
– Why not?
– Well, because I haven’t been there! (Greimas 2005[1966]: 70)
Th e analysis by Greimas consists of two main statements. First, humorous stories are 
composed of two parts. Second, in the joke there is an opposition or a variation of 
isotopies, which is masked by a shared term. As these isotopies have to stand in a 
relation of opposition to one another, it is exactly this that allows us to distinguish these 
variations of isotopies from rhetoric fi gures (metaphor, simile, metonymy). In case of 
the latter ones we also encounter several rivalling planes of meaning. However, in case 
of metaphor one can talk about the fi eld of attraction of the dominating isotopy, which 
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guarantees the homogeneity of a polysemous discourse, whereas in case of a pun it is 
impossible to single out a dominant isotopy as here it is the hierarchical equality that 
is essential. Th erefore, according to Greimas, the comic eff ect of such texts arises from 
“revelation of two diff erent isotopies in a narrative which seemed to be homogenous” 
(Greimas 2005[1966]: 71).
Th e description of humour as provided by Greimas has several essential weaknesses. 
Firstly, the concept of isotopy, so widely used in Paris School semiotics, is still ambiguous 
and not yet well-established, which is why it is oft en used when talking about diff erent 
and hardly comparable structural characteristics of a text (Nastopka 2010: 160). It seems 
that at present the most popular and productive defi nition of isotopy is the following: 
“a redundant set of semantic categories which enable the uniform reading” (Greimas 
1970: 188). When analysing the pun in Structural Semantics, Greimas makes use of a 
diff erent concept of isotopy based on repetition of classemes. However, not only can it 
be criticized severely by demonstrating that the diff erence between semes and classemes 
as defi ned in his work is poorly-founded or underdeveloped (see Attardo 1994: 74–75), 
but also its explanatory potential is obscure in general, as the aforementioned units of 
meaning later on came to be abandoned (Landowski 2005: 19).
Th e ultimate solution of this technical problem does not belong to the objectives of 
the present article. However, it is important to note that, irrespective of the defi nition 
of isotopy, its description is performed more or less consciously and it inevitably 
depends on the selection of the relevant elements of text, which is determined by the 
preconceived determination. As demonstrated previously, coherence of a text fi xated 
by any of the means of semiotic practises is characteristic not as much of the text itself 
as of the understanding of that text that already took place: no linguistic formation 
is coherent in itself, instead it is the reading of the text, guided by intentionality of 
consciousness, that manages to perform a coherent reading of it. It is because of this 
that the singling out of dominating isotopies can lead to diff erent interpretations, and 
that even the most semantically inconsistent text can nevertheless be perceived as 
meaningful (see Nastopka 2010: 161).
Th en, whatever the defi nition of isotopy, isotopy’s main function is to construct 
the meaning of the text consistently while making use of the rules of interpretative 
coherence. As a meaningful text has to have a shared direction as a whole, isotopies 
are needed as tools which allow to overcome the heterogeneity of the meaning of text 
elements, i.e. in order to choose the one reading compatible with all the elements of 
a text. In this respect, repetition of “semantic categories” does not even have to be 
lexically expressed, and its recognition could not function without application of a 
certain cultural grid.
However, even thus defi ned, the specifi cs of this element of semiotic description 
does not explain how a “productive” inner inconsistency of a comic text diff ers from 
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any “opaque” text the ambivalence of which, under normal circumstances, should be 
removed and written off  as irrelevant (thus to remain beyond the limits of interpretation, 
“behind the scenes” of a semantic description). In Greimassian semiotics hindrances 
to coherent reading are removed while still in the state of “implicit understanding”, 
so when formalizing them, an aspectuality especially important in this case is lost. 
It is interesting that in order to describe the latter, in this analysis Greimas uses a 
psychologized vocabulary which is highly uncharacteristic of him: a contradictory 
isotopy is introduced and “revealed” “unexpectedly”, and homogeneity of the narrative 
is characterised by “seaming”.
(2) An article from 1966 by Violette Morin, where an analysis of a corpus of jokes 
based on Greimas’ theory is presented, emphasizes not the coexistence of isotopies in a 
text, but Greimas’ statement that jokes are composed of several parts. Morin develops 
the insight further by stating that every joke has a tripartite structure. Every part of 
this structure is associated with a certain function of the development of a humorous 
narrative (Morin 1966: 108). Normalization introduces characters and situation 
(compare with “introductory narrative” above), connection establishes the problem 
or poses a question (in the story analysed by Greimas it is the part of the dialogue 
where “a shared term” appears) and disjunction solves the problem comically (the last 
sentence in the pun analysed by Greimas).
Th us a joke is defi ned by Morin as a sequence of three narrative functions. But 
even from this short introduction one can notice that Morin’s functions are in their 
own way variants of both the narrative functions of Propp and the narrative stages of 
Greimas which are based on the latter ones. Basically, Morin makes the “dialogue part” 
of Greimas more detailed and defi nes the three stages as logically presupposing one 
another and as actively forming a humorous narrative.
It should be emphasized that these functions do not gain any semantic content 
and only depict a formal model of text development. Th erefore, despite the validity 
of Morin’s conclusions, one can maintain that they are of a more generic character 
than she aspired to as they outline a scheme applicable not only to jokes or narrative 
jokes, but also to any narrative. In this sense, the only diff erence between “serious” 
and “humorous” texts is the “comic” resolution which is not explicated by Morin and 
in which the intuitively perceived trait of the object of analysis is used to explain the 
object itself: joke are narratives with funny resolutions.
Such conclusions are symptomatic and only once more point to the premises and 
implications of the semiotic project discussed previously. In the spotlight of attention of 
semiotics are the structures that are articulated in explicating experience of coherence 
and that are common to all texts. It is in this respect that comic and non-comic 
narratives can be constructed according to the same rules, and utterances “Adam ate 
an apple” and “a cat caught a mouse” can be formalized in the same way: “[...] the 
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content of actions constantly changes, actors change, but utterance-performance does 
not change at all as its continuity is warranted by the particular distribution of roles” 
(Greimas 2005: 227).
Despite the aspects that deserve criticism, both descriptions, nevertheless, contain 
a shared nucleus (if not properly articulated by the authors) which allows to envisage 
a way of semiotic approach to humour. At fi rst glance it may seem that Morin and A. J. 
Greimas locate roots of humour at diff erent levels of text. Greimas associates the comic 
eff ect with the semantic structure of a narrative (i.e. with the revelation of a specifi c 
relation of isotopies), while Morin refers to the narrative structure of the joke as the 
condition of humour. However, their considerations may be seen to share two elements: 
disjunction of [meanings] (compare Morin’s second function and the opposition of 
isotopies of Greimas) and the linear organization [of the perception of a joke] which 
is present in both Morin’s sequence of functions and in the fi ve-stage description of a 
joke analysis by Greimas.
If one joins the two aspects, one can maintain that in case of humorous narratives we 
encounter two fundamental stages of text perception. In the fi rst stage the fi rst isotopy 
is established, in the second it is proceeded by the second, opposite isotopy with the 
help of diff erent types of shared elements. As the organization of the text is linear, and 
the process of text interpretation is a process of perception, a coherent reading should 
also be conducted in a linear manner. Introduction of linearity into humour analysis 
essentially means the requirement to take into account that the elements of a comic 
text are perceived one aft er another. It is important that such a linear organization does 
not necessarily correspond to the relations presupposed by the narrative grammar of 
the text. Th e latter have the character of logical presupposition. Yet in the case of a 
comic eff ect, the chronological aspect of perception becomes important, as does the 
process of semiosis, i.e. the process of the emergence of meaning in which the perceiver 
participates as well and which usually remains unproblematic in the semiotic sense.
3. Articulating the implicit: Humour as a process
Th e requirement to take into account the reader’s perspective might seem trivial: aft er 
all, any text is perceived on the temporal axis. However, various types of research in the 
fi eld of humour show that humorous texts are characterized by a certain strategy which 
is aimed at the perceiver in a way that most other literary texts are not. For instance, 
it has been noted multiple times that the eff ectiveness of most jokes rests upon the 
information being revealed in a certain succession and at a certain time for them to 
have a surprising eff ect. Th is is why any attempt to formally describe the mechanisms 
of humorous texts has to take into account the sequence of their perception. 
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However, focusing only on the perception without its correlation with the text 
structures and the conditions which enable it would make it impossible to provide a 
satisfactory defi nition of humour. In such a case it would only be possible to state that 
humorous texts are texts which are perceived as funny when being read in a certain way. 
In order to state that a humorous text creates a humorous eff ect by being perceived in 
a linear way one has to have an intuition about which texts will be funny beforehand. 
However that would not be a satisfactory defi nition of humour, only a defi nition of a 
way of reading which allows for a humorous text to be perceived as such. Th is is why 
it is necessary to take into account not only the structural elements of the organization 
of humorous texts, which correlate with their perception, but also the various aspects 
of knowledge and memory, which can infl uence the perception (e.g. a joke being heard 
for the fi rst time, knowing the structure of a joke before hearing it etc.).
A detailed listing of the attributes of a humorous text remains beyond the scope of 
this paper which instead focuses on defi ning the most important objects and relations 
which should form the core of semiotic description of humour and considers the need 
of including the perceiver into the description. In my opinion, these should include 
not only the structural organization of the text but also the phenomenology of its 
perception, i.e. the structures of the perceiver and the act of perception.
(1) Most authors (e.g. Freud 1966; Bergson 2005[1901]; Raskin 1979) agree that a 
crucial structural element of humorous texts is a kind of internal antinomy based on 
an internal logic characteristic of jokes. Basically, this means that the fi ctional world of 
a humorous text functions in accordance with a set of internal rules which are usually 
left  implicit, but which can be explicated by means of inference. Th is applies not only 
to exclusively linguistic aspects of the text (the form of expression), but also to the logic 
of actions and cause–eff ect relations (the form of content).
Th is does not mean that “serious” texts are always logically sound and conform to the 
rules of common sense or laws of physics. However, logical aspects become especially 
important when defi ning the nature of the antinomy within humorous texts. Th is is 
where the procedure of reading a text coherently becomes crucial. As demonstrated 
earlier, coherent reading depends on the links between the text elements established by 
the perceiver. It does not matter if these are links between the phonemes, graphemes, 
fi ctitious objects or actions of the characters. What is important is that the successful 
linking of the elements allows us to establish a model in accordance with which the 
fi ctitious world or the text is then expected to develop and function. It is these rules, 
implied by the text, that constitute a kind of a logical system, even if this system does 
not coincide with the rules of order of the empirically experienced world.
Hence, when faced with the internal inconsistency of the text (the two possible 
strategies of reading the joke analysed by Greimas: one in accordance with public isotopy 
 Methodological issues and prospects of semiotics of humour  147
and the other in accordance with private isotopy) the reader does not necessarily have 
to be misled in the non-cooperative sense of “being lied to”. Despite hiding information, 
humorous texts do not fall under the Gricean category of non-cooperative behaviour 
which leads to eff ective communication being impossible. In fact, it is obvious that such 
humorous texts are “effi  cient” in communicating a special kind of – i.e. humorous – 
information. Th is is why in case of humour it is suffi  cient for the text not to comply 
fully with the logic it itself established. Th us, the internal contradiction of such texts 
has to be a local one.
Th e requirement to be able to describe such a phenomenon is not new to semiotics. 
Th e immanence principle is, basically, the requirement to take a critical distance with 
respect to common-sense beliefs, as well as to the meanings or links valid in natural 
language, in order to describe the internal logic of the text elements. Th ere are many 
description practices, from narrative semiotics to semiotics of passion, designed for 
doing exactly that. Application of these tools to humorous texts could productively 
contribute to solving the problem of describing and cataloguing the various mechanisms 
of internal inconsistency of humorous texts (see Ritchie 2014).
(2) If a “serious” text (even if full of metaphors or simply polysemous) usually complies 
with coherent reading, humorous texts usually break this mechanism in one way or 
another. Th is rule-breaking is directly linked to the competence of the reader, which 
is manipulated by the structure of humorous texts. However, the status of these rules 
of coherent reading, as well as the nature of this manipulation, is oft en ambiguous. 
Th ese problems could be solved by making use of the distinction between the uttered 
and the perceived message. 
It is clear that no text, especially when being read for the fi rst time, is perceived as a 
whole at once. However the reader has to presuppose that whole, i.e. he has to construct 
the text as a “referent of imagination” (Greimas 1995: 80). Moreover, that referent should 
be fl exible and dynamic in order for it to be possible to change in the hermeneutic 
process. Hence the reader could be described not as a subject with an ontological 
status, but as a structure of an ideal reader, established by the text itself as an element 
of a structure of perception, partly dependent on the structure of every particular text, 
and thus an element which can be legitimately included in the description.
Th e referent of a text, constructed in the imagination of the reader (to use the term 
in its Kantian sense), is a hypothesis which has a psycholinguistic reality. For example, 
Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) have demonstrated that the interpretation of a text is being 
gradually constructed in the memory of the reader by using a number of cognitive 
operations (selection/deletion, generalization, construction); the relation between the 
text and the memory of the reader is also an object of constant inquiry which allows 
to determine the marked places of the text used for humorous eff ect (for instance, to 
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stress the importance of the position of the punch line) (e.g. see Bruche-Schulz 2014). 
Th is allows us to draw a few important conclusions. First, apparently, some elements 
of the text activate certain “schemes” in the imagination of the reader, the semantic 
extent of which can be diff erent from that of the literary lexical meaning of the text. It 
is the coordination of these schemes that allows to attain a coherent comprehension of 
any text. Second, the gradual construction of this “referent of imagination” implies a 
model of trial and error, and thus allows for manipulation of the interpretation process. 
Th ird, the inclusion of the processes of memory in the analysis of humorous texts would 
explain how the contradictory meanings of the text can be perceived as co-existing, 
since this aspect is crucial in order for the text to have a humorous eff ect.
(3) It is intuitively clear that reading, even if it is led by a hypothesis of a coherent 
whole, always proceeds in a chronological way. For instant, the process of deciphering 
a sentence proceeds by choosing between various meanings (semes) of its lexical units 
(lexemes). When a coherent set of variants (i.e. an isotopy) is chosen, it is accepted as 
the meaning of a sentence. An analogous process takes place with respect to larger text 
units until all of the units which comprise a text are coherently combined.
Keeping in mind the principles in accordance with which a coherent perception 
of the text is constructed, it is clear that during the process not only the referential 
meaning of words, but also the encyclopaedic knowledge, contextual information as 
well as the previous experience of encounters with similar texts are being activated in 
the structure of the perceiver. On the one hand, such nature of perception opens the way 
to erroneous readings of the text (and even for an erroneous perception of the text as 
humorous). However, at the same time the knowledge of these possible interpretation 
strategies allows taking advantage of them in order to hide parts of information only to 
be revealed at the exact time necessary for the humorous eff ect to take place (see Ritchie 
2006). Needless to say, such “knowledge” of the possible strategies of interpretation 
should by no means be understood as a reference to the author of a humorous text. It 
is merely a useful metaphor aimed at describing a causal connection between the text 
structures and the process of their interpretation.
Such a relation between the text and its perceiver allows for a semiotic description, 
where the text (utterance) and its addressee would be formalized as actants of 
communication exchanging a modality of knowledge which is obtained either directly 
(as is the case with humour) or by intervention of discursive elements. Depending on 
the perspective (the one of the addresser or the one of the addressee), this relation can 
be articulated by the squares depicted in Fig. 1.
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      Reader (addressee)
able to know
Utterance (addresser)
able not to know
unable not to know unable to know
not making not to know not making to know
making to know making not to know
Figure 1. Greimassian analysis of interpretation.
Further, by applying the modalities of veridiction it is possible to state that, by analogy 
with the cognitive dimension of the discourse, the knowledge can be projected on the 
addressee from the various possible cognitive positions, namely, being + appearing; not 
being + not appearing; being + not appearing; not being + appearing, thus manipulating 
the competence of the perceiver of the text (Greimas, Courtés 1979). In other words, 
in the case of humorous texts it is possible to articulate the relation between the reader 
and the text as a polemic structure where the reader is interested in achieving coherent 
knowledge of the text, and the text, in turn, is manipulating the knowledge of the reader 
to disturb this process. Th us, from a semiotic perspective humour should be defi ned 
not as an immanent structure of the text, but rather as an eff ect of semiosis which takes 
place as a result of a specifi c reading of the text that can be formalized. Th is also calls 
for a revision of the semiotic defi nition of meaning. Rather than being defi ned as a 
possibility of transcoding (in this case the concepts of meaning and coherence appear 
to be coextensive if not synonymous), meaning should be perceived as an eff ect of a 
relation between the text and its perceiver, which can gain various modalities.
Th ese requirements might seem declarative. However, adopting such a perspective 
in semiotic studies of humour allows drawing a few important methodological 
conclusions. First, by defi ning humour as an eff ect of the antagonistic structure of 
a text and its reader, it is possible to clarify the limits of the possible applications of 
semiotics as well as to evaluate some of the main concepts that are oft en used without 
proper refl ection. Also, one of the strengths of the proposed analysis of humour is its 
relative independence from psychological and philosophical fi elds of humour research. 
Finally, further research into aspects of text and reader relations could open up a way of 
studying other reading eff ects that are currently considered to be mainly psychological 
and are thus treated as marginal in semiotics.
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Методологические проблемы и перспективы семиотики юмора
Цель статьи – предложить способ определения юмора с помощью семиотики Греймаса и 
представить юмор как уникальный объект семиотического анализа. На основе текстов 
Греймаса автор статьи исследует фундаментальные эпистемологические предпосылки 
семиотического анализа текста и дает критическую оценку существующих попыток 
семиотического определения юмора посредством связывания их проблематичных 
аспектов с принадлежностью к имплицитно определенной сфере интересов семиотики. 
В итоге показывается, что продуктивное семиотическое описание комического 
текста возможно при пересмотре существующих эпистемологических предпосылок и 
расширении традиционной области семиотических исследований.
 Methodological issues and prospects of semiotics of humour  151
Huumorisemiootika metodoloogilised küsimused ja väljavaated
Artikli eesmärgiks on pakkuda välja võimalus, kuidas tuvastada huumorit Greimase semiootika 
abil ning kuidas eristada huumorit semiootilise analüüsi ainulaadse objektina. Greimase tekstide 
najal arutletakse semiootilise tekstianalüüsi fundamentaalsete epistemoloogiliste eelduste 
üle ja antakse kriitiline hinnang juba olemasolevatele katsetele pakkuda välja semiootiline 
huumoridefinitsioon, sidudes nende problemaatilisi aspekte implitsiitselt defineeritud 
semiootilise huviväljaga. Lõpuks näidatakse, et koomilise teksti produktiivselt semiootiline 
kirjeldamine on võimalik, kui vaadatakse üle status quo epistemoloogilised seisukohad ning 
laiendatakse vastavalt traditsioonilist semiootilise analüüsi välja.
